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A

Fiscal Paternalism

and

New

England

Policy for the

Year 2000

Cities:

Mark

S.

Ferber and Elizabeth A. Ferber

The following commentary explores the future of urban public finance by focusing on the fiscal ills of New England 's major cities. The impact of general
revenue sharing, categorical grants, federal tax policy, state aid, and own-source
city revenues is assessed in light of a city*s ability to support itself The authors

—

conclude that a pattern of 'fiscal paternalism" the past and present policies
for annual financial assistance to narrow the expenditure-revenue budget gap
must be altered if cities are to enter the twenty-first century as fiscally stable

—

governments capable of providing the necessary services for a varied constituency.

mayor of New York City, writer Norman Mailer suggested that the most likely method of resolving the City's well-publicized fiscal
problems would be for it to secede from New York State and apply for independent statehood status. Mailer reasoned that secession would increase the direct
flow of federal dollars to the City, would eliminate the costs of compliance with
state regulations and the implementation of state-mandated programs, would per-

In

1969,

as a candidate for

mit the City to retain 100 percent of the revenues generated within

and would preclude the potential

its

borders,

suburban legislators, unsympathetic to the
City's needs, to exercise their political power at the expense of the City. On its
face, the proposal seemed somewhat absurd. Yet, twenty years later, it appears
that a number of New England's largest cities might contemplate the same course
of action to obtain the same benefits.
The vision that Mailer's proposal sought to address in 1969 was one of urban
fiscal

for

independence. The prospect of statehood for

then what a policy aimed at
represent

now — an end

fiscal

independence for

to fiscal paternalism

New York City represented
New England's cities would

on the part of

federal

and

state

governments toward urban centers.
Fiscal paternalism can be defined as an unhealthy dependence by urban centers
on state and federal financial policies and programs for the purpose of ensuring
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and New
England's major cities would be burdened by budget deficits that would force a
wholesale redefinition of city government in order for debts to be paid. Reduce
state and federal assistance, as some legislators now contemplate, without an attendant financial plan for the now-dependent cities, and programmatic chaos
those

cities'

financial stability. Eliminate state

should not be unexpected. Like a child
being taught to
allowance,

manage money by

cities

dependent on

who

is

and

federal assistance,

learning to be independent after

application of a parent-supplied weekly

state

and federal allowances must be

allotted a

period of transition in order to adjust to the prospects of a future without the
nest of funds that policies of fiscal paternalism have provided.

important to understand that this problem did not appear overnight but
rather evolved over two decades to its present point. During the late sixties and
It is

early seventies, cities were the primary beneficiaries of the

Entitlement"

"Age

of

— so named because of the federal policy whereby grants-in-aid were

heaped on almost any jurisdiction regardless of whether they were necessary. All
that was really necessary was a properly filed grant application. In retrospect,
however, the price of these grants was actually quite high, for cities' acceptance
of such monies opened the door to federal interference in local policy planning.
Today, in view of its own soaring deficit, the federal government has proclaimed an Age of Fiscal Enlightenment. The federal financial commitment to
cities has been dramatically reduced, and cities face mounting financial pressures.
The process of directing national urban policy away from extravagant provision
for nonessential programs and toward seemingly random cuts in now-essential
services has found cities relinquishing their reins of control over the breadth and
depth of services to be provided. In terms of setting urban priorities, policy has
followed the purse rather than the other way around.
Since the future we frequently define as the year 2000 is only fifteen years
away, it behooves us to consider steps that can be taken by our cities to improve
their prospects for financial independence in the years ahead. Such a review
should begin with a glance at the policies that delineated the parameters of what

we now

An

call fiscal

paternalism.

Overview

From 1960

to 1968, the

number of

federal grant

programs exploded from 45 to

435, without a concomitant explosion of social satisfaction resulting from the expenditures. America had recognized that it was an urban nation with a need to
1

Yet no national urban policy existed. A
paternalistic federal funding policy, referred to as the Great Society, attempted to
solve all ills by throwing money at them. The federal government provided a range
support the development of

of programs that permitted

its cities.

it

to intrude

on the management of

cities

and

to

define, in part, the quality of life which cities could afford their residents. Local
officials welcomed an array of programs for the elderly, the disadvantaged, and
the unemployed in large measure because the programs generated political support
from local constituencies without asking local taxpayers to pay the bill directly.
Federal aid accounted for 30 percent of general revenues for cities in the late
2
fifties; by fiscal 1971 federal aid was responsible for 37 percent of local budgets.

Still,

one of the most important sources of federal assistance did not appear

1972. In that year, the general revenue sharing plan, discussed in

more

until

detail

was introduced. Unlike the categorical grant programs that preceded it,
general revenue sharing was intended to help counteract the expenditure-revenue
imbalance that cities were experiencing by providing unrestricted cash support for
later,

city

programs. 3

Unrestricted federal grants to cities totaled $4.6 billion in 1972. In 1985, the

White House determined that it could shave $23.8 billion off the federal deficit
between 1986 and 1990 by eliminating the general revenue sharing program
altogether. 4 Although the federal government apparently found it acceptable to
recommend elimination of the program, mayors and city dwellers alike found
it

unusually difficult to accept the cuts because

more than

ever, general revenue

sharing funds were being used to support essential city services.

The

federal

from reducing the expenditure-revenue imbalance, had created an even greater imbalance, masked only by the annual infusion of these
effort of 1972, far

dollars.

advanced unabated throughout the sixties and
seventies. The relationship between the federal government and American cities
became increasingly dependent and structured, providing the former with the opportunity to dictate both the breadth and depth of municipal services. This intervention was paternalism at its worst: a veritable intrusion into every City Hall
that either willingly received or was politically pressured into accepting a portion
Policies of fiscal paternalism

of the federal largesse. Now, in 1985,

cities

are witnessing the federal govern-

ment's withdrawal of municipal financial assistance, and they are being
without an independent means of raising revenues to replace the

The

left

lost dollars.

on the need to
most prominent

rhetoric of the seventies focused congressional attention

develop a national urban policy.

we have

It

appears

now

that the

show for those policy efforts are downtown revitalization
projects and their most frequent patrons, center-city Yuppies. After two decades
of undirected urban programs, the future of our cities remains in peril: not from
conflicts within urban centers themselves but from the insidious, undermining effects of fiscal paternalism. During the twenty-odd years in which there was a
steady flow of revenues from the federal government, city officials were led to
believe that such funds would be forever forthcoming; today, they are learning
benefits

that nothing

to

— not even

fiscal

paternalism

—

is

forever.

The more money urban America accepted from the federal government, the
more federal urbanologists believed their programs were succeeding. But federal
money was only camouflaging some urban ills while it was actually creating
others.

None of

the federal funds were used to assist cities in planning for a

future independent of federal assistance; instead, federal programs were
ing an integral part of the

new menu of urban

services,

becom-

complete with their

own

vociferous, dependent constituencies.

In the late 1970s, as federal programs lapsed, state governments were asked to

cover the shortfall

lest

the

momentum

of municipal revitalization be

stifled.

dependence was transferred from federal funds alone to a mix of federal
monies. There were now two fiscal parents for cities to look to for
guidance and to depend on for funds.
Fiscal

and

state
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General Revenue Sharing

By and large, what revenue sharing tends to do
money in a more politically palatable form.

— Paul N.

is

give a lesser

amount of

Ylvisaker, Professor of Education

Former Dean, Harvard Graduate School
of Education

New

from many of the problems experienced by
who are on fixed incomes and who are dependent on the federal

England's largest

senior citizens

government for

cities suffer

their Social Security checks.

These

citizens recognize that the na-

tion has a bulging deficit, but they vigorously fight Social Security benefit cut-

backs because they have grown to rely on their no-strings entitlement stipend.

8

a supplemental payment to enhance has now become basic income on which to survive.
The General Revenue Sharing program (GRS), enacted as part of the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, was heralded as a means of resolving the

What was once

had begun to plague many of the
nation's older, poorer cities. Ironically, some "neoliberal" Democrats who remain staunch defenders of Social Security have sided with the Reagan Administhat
tration's policy of monetary cutbacks in our cities' Social Security system
is, general revenue sharing. Proponents of the cuts argue that the impact on local
fiscal conditions would be moderate, 6 since general revenue sharing represents
structural expenditure-revenue imbalance that
5

—

than 2 percent of the total revenues of local governments, but this is not so
for New England's older communities.
Boston, which found itself a scavenger for state aid in order to close a $55
million revenue gap predicted for fiscal 1986, received $18 to $19.5 million annually in revenue sharing monies from 1982 to 1985. 7 Burlington, Vermont, and
less

Portland, Maine, depend on intergovernmental aid for

more than

15 percent of

their operating revenues. After direct state assistance, general revenue sharing

component of these operating budget lifelines. Providence relies on intergovernmental assistance for more than 25 percent of its budget, while Hartford requires state and federal transfer payments to supply more
represents the largest single

than 30 percent of its annual budget. 8
Older cities accepted the advent of general revenue sharing with guarded optimism. The optimism was fostered by the belief that revenue sharing funds

would not be accompanied by the programmatic restrictions of categorical aid
and block-grant monies. On the negative side, there was skepticism because revenue sharing represented a net reduction in dollars transferred to cities by the
federal government. New England cities were designating revenue sharing monies
and therefore
police, fire, education
for the staples of government service
were disturbed by the decrease in federal assistance that general revenue sharing

—

—

represented.

The

federal government's decision in 1981 to eliminate state

government par-

program was predicated on the conclusion that
9
the fiscal condition of state governments no longer warranted federal subsidies.
The same can hardly be said of New England's major cities in 1985.
In our view, the federal government accepted certain ''parental" responsibilities
in 1972 when it created the general revenue sharing program, among them the

ticipation in the revenue sharing

commitment

money and

atmosphere of
than further the urban addiction to federal
funds. The task of weaning urban America away from the flow of federal funds
cannot be accomplished overnight. While some may see a strategy reminiscent of
to nurture cities' use of this

to create an

fiscal strength at the city level, rather

triage as

since

it

an acceptable approach to federal deficit-cutting

means

policies,

we do

not,

certain regression for older cities that are just beginning to recover

from the burdens of a severe recession, record inflation, and increased pressures
to provide social services for a dependent population of urban poor.
With an eye toward its own goal of deficit reduction, the federal government
should promote a policy of phased reduction in general revenue sharing rather
than one of drastic cuts. In the scenario we envision, phased reduction would:

postpone the termination of the fiscal general revenue sharing grants into the
next decade;

provide grants on a revised need-based formula that would consider:
level

of the population,

(2)

the ability of the city to use

other than the local property tax, to replace the
ability

GRS

its

(1)

the income

own-source revenues,

share of revenues, and

(3)

the

of the state and county governments to provide supplemental assistance

specifically to mitigate the fiscal hardship

require the dedication of any continued

GRS

minated when

induced by the elimination of GRS; and

GRS funds for programs

that will be ter-

ends unless new revenue sources are developed.

Federal Grants
The Carter Administration had a very good urban policy until it announced it
was going to develop one.
Richard Nathan
The Brookings Institution

—

When

Richard Nixon was president, the federal share of

enues was

5 percent.

By

before President Carter

city

government

rev-

midway through the Carter Administration and
enacted his new national urban policy, the federal share
1978,

of city government revenues reached

its

peak

at 15 percent.

10

It is little

wonder

urban leaders preferred the earlier Carter urban aid flow to the more bureaucratic grantsmanship policies of Carter's New Partnership national urban policy.
that

Despite Carter's best efforts, the

more

A

politics,

New

fewer projects, and

brief review of

scape illustrates

why

how

Partnership represented more paperwork,

less cash.

the use of federal funds shaped the urban fiscal land-

the proposed reductions in federal grants in the fiscal 1986

will be certain to cause service disruptions and disorganization in the urban financial planning process. Federal aid to state and local governments, which
was less than $1 billion in the early 1940s, grew to $7 billion by 1960, $23 billion
by 1970, and more than $96 billion by 1981. 11 As the dollars grew, so did the
programs through which they were funneled. Barely a dozen programs in the
mid-forties swelled to nearly 200 by the mid-sixties and then doubled to more
than 400 by 1970. 12
Not only was federal domestic spending growing, but so was the federal government's direct involvement in local government affairs. The federal government

budget
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was responsible for providing funds and operating guidelines for the War on
Poverty, Model Cities, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Urban
Mass Transit Administration, and the Urban Development Action Grants, as well
as for coalescing constituencies for each of these programs. These constituencies,
which evolved into sources of urban electoral power, first developed a taste for
the money, then an expectation of more money, and, finally, a dependence on

every dollar received.

The massive infusion of

federal

money

created almost as

many problems

as

new

solved. Federal grants for capital projects were frequently biased in favor of

construction.

As a

result,

some

local priorities

that were targeted for federal support.

From

it

were deferred in favor of projects

1957 to 1977, as the federal share of

from 10 to 40 percent of total project costs, the
existing infrastructure
roads, bridges, water and sewer systems, and public
buildings
eroded, owing to a lack of funding for repair and replacement of constructed projects. By 1979, as policymakers began to focus their attention on the
capital project funding increased

10

—

—

need for maintenance of the existing infrastructure, federal funding for these
local projects had begun to decline in response to federal budgetary pressures. 13
Even the Final Report of the Urban and Regional Policy Group, chaired by
then Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Patricia Roberts Harris, commented on the serious shortcomings of federal urban aid programs:
Programs have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, causing problems of administration
and coordination. While efforts at funding innovative programs like urban
renewal have helped cities redevelop deteriorated areas, they have also ended up
They have
deteriorating more low-income housing than they have replaced.
weakened the neighborhoods and encouraged suburban sprawl.
The Federal
Government has supported the development of industry outside the central cities
while funding training programs in the central cities for jobs that did not exist. 14
.

.

.

Though

.

.

.

the report was intended to serve as a framework for the

ship subsequently proposed by President Carter,

it is

New

Partner-

questionable whether the

administration fully appreciated the report's significance. The administration

should have concluded from

it

that local governments needed to strengthen their

independent capacities to accurately determine their
establish the

means of funding

their desired projects

president's speech announcing the

new urban

own

project priorities

and

to

and programs. Instead, the

policy demonstrated the administra-

tion's deduction that further federal intervention in local priority-setting

was not

only desirable, but actually required:
During

this period, the early 1970s, the Federal

responsibilities, leaving states

or leadership to accomplish

and

all

localities

government retreated from

its

with insufficient resources, interest

that needed to be done.

We

learned that states

These experiences
must build a partnership that involves
the leadership of the Federal government and the participation of all levels of
governments, the private sector, neighborhood and voluntary organizations
and individual citizens. 15

and

localities

cannot solve the problems by themselves.

.

.

.

taught us that a successful urban policy

The New Federalism of

the

Reagan Administration, which followed on the

heels

of Carter's lackluster urban effort, took a dramatically different course. Instead of
continuing the policy of interposing the federal government in local affairs,

it

enacted programmatic reductions that resulted in a loss of 13.3 percent of federal
aid in a single year to cities with populations of more than 250,000. The Urban
Institute estimated that the policy of

New

Federalism,

implemented,
and local budgets would

if fully

would mean that the federal government's share of state
be reduced from 25 percent in 1984 to 4 percent by 1997. 16
This feast-to-famine cycle of federal funding for urban America does not provide the basis for a sound policy of urban fiscal independence. For those New
England cities that had made especially good use of federal grants to spur the
revitalization of

downtown

areas, the reversal in federal funding policies repre-

Urban DevelopEngland,
because this
ment Action Grants (UDAGs)
an
exceptionally
broad-based
success record
established
country
has
region of the
sents a particular hardship. In fact, the reduction of funds for
will especially affect

as a result of

In Boston

UDAG projects.
alone, UDAG funds

ment of some twenty

New

11

of more than $60 million have spurred develop-

projects since 1978, while

Community Development Block

Grants (CDBGs) provided an average of $28.3 million per year between 1976 and
1980 and have been providing about $22 million per year since then. Portland,
and CDBG funds creatively to help finance the
Maine, has also utilized

UDAG

revitalization of

its

central business district. Private capital to support the devel-

opment of the important waterfront area and the redevelopment of the major
Bath Iron Works facility was obtained as a result of the seed monies made available by the selective use of these federal programs to match city-selected priorities. Providence is another city with a successful, major downtown redevelopment
program, the Capital Center Project, which plans to relocate the

city's train sta-

tion in order to free approximately thirty-two acres for commercial real estate

development. 17 Like Boston and Portland, Providence has

made

excellent use of

its

monies to elicit private participation in public capital projects that
otherwise would have had great difficulty meeting start-up cost requirements.
Based on the many media accounts of groundbreaking ceremonies for federally
funded downtown development sites, the employment benefits of these grant programs are quite significant. (In fact, quantifying job-generation potential is a
standard requirement on federal grant applications.) Although less easily quantified, the positive impact on local economic development from Urban Mass Transit
Authority improvement monies and Environmental Protection Agency technical
assistance funds is no less important. Federal grant programs have been responsible
not only for original projects but also for the amelioration of already existing
facilities. Thus, by improving the general quality of life in urban centers, the programs have increased their ability to attract both new and expanding businesses.
The decision of the Reagan Administration greatly to restrict the allocation of
monies for future development projects will retard but not irreparably cripple the
development process. However, the reduction in grants for development projects
already beyond the planning process stage may be responsible for the reversal of
the most positive economic development trends that these cities have witnessed
since the outset of the federal grant programs. The administration's recent willingness to create "enterprise zones" as examples of an urban assistance program
designed to replace the direct funding of priority projects is admirable, but this
federal grant

mechanism will not provide
urban economic recovery.

sufficient assistance for cities trying to sustain their

New England Journal
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Can Do

Having reviewed the history and current status of federal grants, we can now
turn our attention to an assessment of what New England's major cities can do
to foster their transition to fiscal stability and independence by the year 2000.
Based on Congress's approach to the fiscal 1986 budget, it is clear that the federal government's past role in urban economic development will be altered in
response to the national priority of federal budget cutting. New England cities,
therefore, should consider amending their own financial planning processes to
reflect a newfound awareness of the federal government's eroding commitment to
its

older

cities:

should not continue to apply for federal grants that mandate levels
of programmatic service the total annual costs for which cannot be provided
the year the grant is received. In short, older cities cannot afford to accept
Cities

12

federal

money

if

in

they cannot go along with the federal strings that accompany

assume that henceforth seed money will be
funds for continuation of programs will not be awarded.

Cities should

just that

it.

and follow-up

should not apply for federal grants that require matching monies unless
these monies can be placed on reserve at the time the grant applications are submitted. Older cities cannot afford to continue seeking federal money like the
already debt-burdened bargain hunter who makes unnecessary purchases merely
because an attractive discount is available.
Cities

must refocus the efforts of their national lobbying organizations, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities. The request for future
federal funds should be restricted to development monies that will provide leverage to obtain private capital, and should not include programmatic funds that
eventually will place a further drain on municipal treasuries. Through their lobbying activities, older cities in particular must assert publicly that federal intrusions
into municipal priority-setting are at an end because the flow of federal funds is
Cities

at its end.

In the

coming decade,

cities

should use the federal grants system to acquire the

economic independence instead of merely seeking a
continuation of funding for the programs that fostered the fiscal paternalism
tools they will need for their

responsible for bigger municipal deficits.

Federal

Two

Tax Policy

specific elements of federal tax policy

have had a significant impact on the

governments to provide for themselves. The first element is the
provision allowing municipal governments to raise funds by soliciting monies
from capital markets on a tax-exempt basis. The second element is the directive
preventing municipal governments from raising funds by taxing property owned
by education institutions, hospitals, churches, and state and federal governments.
The use of tax-exempt debt by municipalities has increased sevenfold since
1959. 18 Access to the capital markets has been a positive source of assistance to
municipal governments seeking long-term funds for new projects or short-term
ability

of

city

funds to ease cash-flow burdens. Big-city mayors have also recognized the usefulness of private-purpose tax-exempt bonds as tools to aid economic develop-

ment and

to

promote

industrial diversification.

As

Intergovernmental Relations recently commented,

Committee on
use of tax-exempt bonds

the Advisory

"The

economic development becomes increasingly important ... as federal grants
are cut back and officials are hard put to find economic incentives to lure infor

dustries to their areas." 19

government moving ahead in its deficit-cutting efforts, increased attention has been paid to the drain on the federal Treasury caused by
surpassing $90 billion in 1983 that has been
the record level of long-term debt
issued. In their efforts to reduce the overall volume of debt, federal policymakers
have attempted to redefine the purposes for which tax-exempt debt may be
issued. 20 If changes restricting tax-exempt debt are enacted by the Congress, debtspurred economic development of convention centers, retail areas, resource
recovery plants, warehouse expansions, private educational facilities, port authorities, airports, and public housing may be adversely affected. The tax reforms of
1984 have already begun to curtail local plans for repairs to and expansion of a
number of job-generating capital projects: state governments and public authorities
have been limited in the issuance of industrial development bonds to a predetermined annual allocation of tax-exempt debt, based on a per-capita formula.
While the federal government is restricting the access of municipalities to taxexempt capital markets, it is doing nothing to restrict the expansion of public
educational facilities, hospitals, and state and federal government buildings
within New England's major cities. Though the new construction may temporarily add workers to employment rolls, it permanently removes real estate
parcels of significant value from the property tax rolls, which further aggravates
an already existing problem. In Boston, where 47 percent of all property remains
entirely untaxed, there is the largest proportion of tax-exempt property in any
major U.S. city other than in Washington, D.C. 21 Hartford suffers not only
because 36 percent of its property is tax-exempt but also because this commitment of property in preferred locations restricts the physical space available for
further commercial development capable of generating substantial property tax

With the

federal

—

—

revenues. 22

One of

the remedies for this problem that

is

acceptable to state and municipal

—

—

is the use of PILOTS
Payment in Lieu of Taxes by tax-exempt
These negotiated payments are clearly not the equivalent of a property tax payment, which by its very nature grows as the wealth of the land and its
appurtenances increases. Nevertheless, PILOTS provide one avenue to ease the
burden of tax-exempt properties.

governments
institutions.

Federal tax policy has been utilized for years to provide indirect subsidies for
special interest

groups or to encourage development

would not expand, owing

in sectors

of the economy

monies required for startwas concentrated on
assisting business growth focused primarily on new development and on the Sun
Belt area. Both the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation for new industrial or commercial plants encouraged investments in new structures and in
that otherwise

up

activities. Previously,

much of

to the lack of

the tax aid provided

growing areas, rather than in the older, more settled cities of New England. 23
Now that the initial exodus from the Northeast to the Sun Belt has taken place,

it

13
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cities

to utilize every economic development tool

and the spawning of new com-

available to encourage existing business expansion

panies through venture capital operations, thereby creating

new

jobs.

There are several aspects of pending federal tax reform legislation that cities
must aggressively fight if they do not want to risk losing some badly needed
financial opportunities:
Cities

must lobby

in

opposition to those tax simplification proposals that would

eliminate the federal income tax deduction for state
tax law change

would save almost $30

and

local taxes.

billion for the U.S. Treasury,

Though such
it

would be

doing so at the direct expense of municipal governments already hurt by previously mentioned cutbacks of federal aid.

14

must lobby to prevent tax reform proposals from further restricting the
volume of tax-exempt revenue bonds. With estimates for the cost of required
upgrades of municipal water and sewerage systems by the year 1990 exceeding
Cities

$90 billion, municipalities can hardly afford to increase their cost of borrowing
improve these systems. 24

to

must begin to lobby for the extension of legislation that permits the issuance of tax-exempt debt to subsidize single- and multifamily housing development. Making center city housing affordable is as important to attracting young
families to the city as any element of a sound urban plan for the future.
Cities

State

Aid
Just as the twig

is

bent, the tree's inclined.

— Alexander Pope, Moral Essays
Despite what

some

state legislators

may

think,

no

big-city

mayor enjoys

the an-

nual ritual of going to the state capital, hat in hand, to pander for state aid. This
process

how

is

frequently accompanied by stern lectures from suburban legislators on

increased state assistance would not be necessary

urban governments

if

would control their profligate spending habits.
It is a myth of public finance that New England's major
aid because they cannot control their expenditures.

It is

cities

need more

state

a fact, though, that in-

creased state aid is required almost annually because city governments in New
England cannot control their own means of revenue generation. For example,
Boston's economic resurgence has been good for its business leaders but of little
help to its government. At times when the state prospers, Boston may receive a
share of

newfound

its

largesse, but a disproportionately small share. Yet

when

Boston is in trouble. The reason is simple: with only the
local property tax to rely on and with an overabundance of tax-exempt properties, Boston must look to Massachusetts to pay for an ever-increasing percentage
of city services. Boston claims that it generates about $1.1 billion in state revstate

growth

enues; yet

it

is

limited,

amount

receives only 21 percent of that

in direct state assistance. 25

In fiscal 1985, state aid represented 34.8 percent of

same
Both

all

Boston revenues. In the

year, Connecticut's assistance represented 37 percent of Hartford's revenues.
cities

states,

are state capitals, both serve as the economic growth centers for their

and both are annually dependent on

their state

governments to define the

parameters of service and the potential for excellence in their municipal governments. For both cities, the success of the appeal for funds to the state legislature

more

be a measure of mayoral job performance than of either the
municipal economy or the municipal budget. "Good" mayors are those who get
along well with powerful state leaders. Whether such mayors are strong in peris

likely to

program engineers
becomes quite secondary, and it is easy to see that this is not the most efficient
way to run a government. A mayor of a major New England city in 1985 should
be judged on more than the lobbying skills required to garner sufficient state aid
once again to temporarily bridge the gap between expenditures and revenues.
If cities are to remain viable as governmental entities providing services and
sonal leadership or adroit as personnel managers or creative as

policy direction for their constituencies, they need to have the fiscal independence

which only a diversified revenue base can provide. As author Ray Bahl has observed, "City governments could argue that state governments regulate their
fiscal decisions and constrain their fiscal options." 26 To alter that present-day
scenario, city governments should:
seek independent revenue-generating powers in lieu of additional state aid;
dedicate state aid to specific categories of services, such as police, fire, and snow
removal, in order to develop a more clearly articulated public argument for more

money; and
seek to increase the
properties

owned

PILOTS made

by state government for tax-exempt

state

within the city's limits.

Property Taxes
In terms of public finance,

New

ness: a revenue base that

far too

England's major

cities share one glaring weakdependent on the local property tax. This
overdependence is particularly problematical in New England because the property tax does not respond well to economic growth in older cities, 27 given the
limited areas available for new construction and for extensive expansions. Addiis

and places a disproportionate share of the
burden of central city costs on the working poor residents of the city. As a result,
increased levels of city services that are paid for by local property taxes effectively represent a transfer of real income from the lower- to the middle-income
tionally, the property tax

population of a

regressive

city. 28

Boston the property tax represents 37.6 percent of the city's
revenues. State and federal subsidies aside, the property tax provides more

For example,
total

is

in

than 90 percent of

all

city-derived revenues.

At the onset of Proposition

2Vi,

Boston was collecting $518 million annually in property tax payments, an amount
which dropped by some 30 percent, to $363 million, only four years later.
In Burlington, Vermont, 68.2 percent of all city-based revenues are derived
from the property tax. Manchester, New Hampshire, similarly receives 69.6 percent of its revenues from the property tax, and Portland, Maine, receives 73.3
percent. Portland has taken a number of steps to reduce government personnel
levels and to develop sewerage system, airport, and port facility revenues, thereby
beginning the process of reducing the city's dependence on the property tax. 29
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During the early 1980s, reliance on property tax was a chief factor contributing to the financial problems that beset several New England cities. In 1982, with
62.5 percent of city revenues coming from the tax, Providence could not adjust
its

expenditure pattern to a 10 percent delinquency rate in collection of the tax. 30

In 1981 the property tax provided 58.1 percent of

revenues in Hartford, but
with 36 percent of that city's property being tax-exempt, it was estimated that

16

all

about $41 million in potential revenues from property taxes was lost. 31
A number of New England's larger cities have been enjoying a building boom
of late that has helped to increase the property tax base without penalizing central city residents. As that period of new construction and redevelopment subsides, greater attention must be focused on how to expand the tax base without
creating disincentives for business growth or more roadblocks to home ownership. Regardless of the quality of city services or the reputation of a city's school
system, property taxes can create economic barriers for young families wishing to
enter a neighborhood.
Mayoral plans or state government directives for city assessors to conduct
comprehensive revaluation efforts do not solve the property tax problem. Such
actions merely affirm that the existing tax, no matter how burdensome, will be
apportioned more equitably. Recommendations to enact city sales taxes or income taxes for city commuters have been analyzed correctly as disincentives for
business growth.

The

potential for regional

income or

sales taxes,

however, has

not been comprehensively reviewed.

While a localized commuter income tax could encourage business to relocate
to suburban office park sites where feasible, a regional commuter income tax
surcharge would incorporate both the central city and the suburban business locations. The tax would be set and collected by the state. The proceeds would be used
to pay for the state's assumption of central city costs peculiar to the operation of
the downtown area, that is, transportation, police, fire, and redevelopmentagency overhead expenses. By allocating business district costs to an employmentcities
related tax
that is, by instituting a commuter income tax surcharge
would be able to apportion the cost of neighborhood operations to residents
through their property taxes. The property tax would then be returned to its role
as the primary tax to support city services for city residents, in lieu of the current
requirement that it pay not only for neighborhood residents' service costs but
also for those of the city's visitors, businesses, and nonresident business

—

—

employees.

User Fees and Other Revenue Sources
//

appears unlikely that user charges can play a major role

rejuvenation of the central

in the fiscal

cities.

— Colin C.

Blaydon and Steven R. Gilford
"Financing the Cities: An Issue Agenda, 1977," in
Municipal Finance: The Duke Law Journal Symposium

now pay

Boston parking tickets by using Visa or MasterCard, which shows that New England's largest city is taking imaginative and
even extreme steps to capture every available dollar of nontax revenues. While
Violators can

their City of

almost 13 percent of city revenues in 1957 were raised from user charges, by 1975
only 18 percent of these revenues were derived from this source, 32 reflecting the
comparatively limited growth in
water, sewer, and

this area

of taxation. While transportation,

inspectional services, along with the costs of

document produc-

can be passed on directly to the service-recipient public, the city's most costly
education, fire, and police cannot be budgeted as successfully on a
services

tion,

—

—

user-charge basis. Consequently, though user charges can help
coffers, they really cannot be relied

on

fill

city

revenue

major revenue gaps caused by
services. In fact, licenses and fees,

to close

creasing personnel costs for essential city

in-

because of their regressive nature, are usually restricted to the amount required to
repay government for the cost of their administration and collection. The urban
centers of New England, already home to a disproportionate number of the poor,

would not be

own

assisting their

tax-paying constituencies by further taxing them

Taxes on services rather than on wealth are not an answer to urban ills; they are merely a reminder to all city residents that every segment of the
population is being called upon to support city services.
The politics of revenue generation become most difficult when small, increin this fashion.

mental fees and charges are levied on the average city resident instead of on
corporations doing business in the city or on suburban residents utilizing the
city as a center for education, entertainment, health care,

and employment op-

portunity.

In fiscal 1985, Boston's user fees provided 4.4 percent of

its

total revenues,

while in Hartford they provided 5 percent of revenues in the same year. 33 Given

would appear
for application and then
pay for the most signifi-

the determined efforts of both cities with regard to user fees,
that

no matter how successfully these taxes are

collected, they will never

amount

to a

sum

selected

sufficient to

it

cant costs of government operation.

While

New England

cities

should be vigilant in their pursuit of user-fee rev-

them should conduct an updated evaluation of the potential
for enhancing this source of revenue. Instead of focusing on user fees, major
cities should direct their efforts toward per-capita taxes that can be exported to
those visitors to the city or to business-district employees who, while they benefit
from the quality of city services, are not required to pay for the cost of these
services when they return to their own state or suburban bedroom community.
These export taxes would include surcharges on entertainment and sporting
enues, each one of

events, student dormitory occupancy, parking spaces, hotel-motel occupancy,

hospital bed occupancy,

and airport departure

sort, unlike traditionally

defined user fees, could generate revenues from a

fees.

Since taxes and fees of this

mostly nonresident tax-paying public, they would create more politically palatable sources of financial independence, as well as fiscally more rewarding ones.

Looking
It

to the Future

was the

inability to grasp the totality that

ahead, eyes wide open,

and plunge

permitted officials to walk straight

directly off the financial cliffs.

— Charles R.

Morris, describing the circumstances

surrounding the 1975 default by

The Cost of Good Intentions

New York

City in

17
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Most people
ity

of

life in

are
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of Public Policy

still

able to fantasize about the possibilities for an enhanced qual-

the year 2000, but city governments look to the future with an abiding

sense of insecurity as to the role cities will be able to play in the system of gover-

nance. Under the present municipal finance structure, which requires

cities to look
governments to direct their mandates, coalesce their constituencies,
and foot their bills, the best urban New England can hope for is the status quo.
Our premise is simple: the status quo does not provide an acceptable urban

to higher-tier

policy course for the future. Policies of fiscal paternalism must not be allowed to

continue unabated and unchallenged. Urban financial planning must replace ur-

ban grantsmanship in defining the programs that cities can provide to their
Own-source city revenues must grow as urban economies improve. City
residents should be able to garner the financial support of suburban residents
who derive benefits from the economic vitality of urban commercial centers. City
residents.

18

residents should be expected to bear the fiscal burdens of their

own

neighbor-

hoods, but they should not be asked to pay for the maintenance and development
of the widely utilized downtown areas.
Cities must assess the effect of current fiscal policies on their ability to determine their course outside the policy initiatives of the White House or the State
House. Only through such realistic appraisal can they plan adequately for the
future. Having made such appraisals, cities could take the following steps toward

assuring their financial independence for the future.

Create

New Revenue

Sources

For revenue diversification to be successful, sources for funds must meet certain
criteria beyond the ability initially to provide enough monies.
Collection of the revenue source must lend itself to easy administration with a
low rate of default and at a cost that allows a net revenue yield of sufficient size.
The new source must have growth potential that will enable it to augment in
response to positive economic trends. It must also have a formula or a taxpayer
group that can be varied, in either case enabling the revenue yield to increase
during times of economic downturn.
Finally, the public must find the tax acceptable, despite its reticence to support
any tax increase. The revenue source must equally affect taxpayers who are
receiving an equivalent service or who own property of equal value. Efficiency,
expandability, equity, and acceptability are the elements that are key to a revenue
program's success in satisfying political requirements the day it is enacted and in
fulfilling public finance

requirements decades

later. 34

Redefine Municipal Services

Given the financial limitations that cities face, city governments must work to
redefine what business they should be in and what segments of the population
they should be certain to serve. The financing and delivery of public services
should be reevaluated with an eye toward shifting duplicative, unnecessary, or
too broadly defined functions to a higher tier of government, if necessary. 35
Cities

must look to the formation of regional

service districts to provide ser-

vices such as transportation, resource recovery, water

and port and airport operations,
that

is

larger than the city's

own

and sewer maintenance,

of which benefit a general user community
resident population. Further, cities should not
all

be reluctant to assess property in the downtown or central business district or to
implement a property tax surcharge that would cover the expense of providing
costly fire services to high-rise buildings, repairs to frequently traveled streets in
retail districts

or warehouse areas, and police services for visiting dignitaries, con-

ventions, sports events,

and other public gatherings.

Lobby for State Assumption of Costs
By providing annual formula-based financial
ments do not help to break the pattern of
to require

more

aid.

By

contrast,

when

assistance to cities, state govern-

fiscal

state

governments, as part of an accepted

dependence that

Why

by

cities,

cities

assume the

programs curthey are creating a path for financial stability and in-

redefinition of municipal services, permanently
rently provided

paternalism that seems endlessly

may

costs of

19

follow.

should the cost of correctional

facilities

be borne by

cities

instead of by

governments, which enact the criminal laws and operate the courts? Why
should the cost of educational services be borne by cities and not by state governstate

ments,

when minimum standards of

proficiency are established by state depart-

ments of education and requirements for special programming are imposed by
state and federal courts? Why should the cost of publicly subsidized housing be
borne by cities, when state governments have greater access to the tax-exempt
capital markets for housing revenue bonds? Why should the cost of social services for the elderly, the handicapped, and the poor be borne by cities, when
standards for service and minimum support are established by the federal Constitution or by federal or state legislation? Cities could better cope with the cost
of services particular to their own municipalities if state governments would
assume the cost for these areas of service, rather than merely provide annual subsidies. As authors Colin Blaydon and Steve Gilford have observed:
Whatever course of action is ultimately selected, it seems clear that the states must
assume a more active role in maintaining the financial strength of America's cities.

The recent period of increasing federal responsibility for financing the cities has
come to a close, and the problems of financing municipal services can no longer
be left to local officials. A new era of vigorous state action is now required. 36

Proceed with

However we

Politically Imperfect Proposals

define the causes of the existing problem, the solutions

all

require

Those who are using but not paying for a city's services today will be
asked to pay for them tomorrow. Such a concept, no matter how gracefully articulated, carefully presented, or skillfully politicked, will not meet with the
grateful approval of the electorate. Suburban voters do not view themselves as
direct beneficiaries of central city services, and it is not surprising that they do
not want to pay for that which they feel they do not receive. Urban politicians,
whose opportunity to obtain higher office may depend on suburban votes, are
taxes.

not quick to alienate their constituents.

For years, the ritual dance for dollars performed by big-city mayors before
house audiences has been a carefully orchestrated plea for help at the budgetary breaking point. Dialogue about establishing urban financial independence
has been lacking without the klieg lights that accompany a crisis. It is vital that
proposals, though politically imperfect, be offered well in advance of the time
state
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solutions are required. Consensus building

is

a painstaking, arduous, educa-

tional process. It will take years, not several meetings or several

months, to reac-

quaint suburban taxpayers with the sense that they do in fact derive direct

from

benefits

New

their central cities

and therefore have

responsibilities to them.

need a new direction for the management of their intergovernmental financial relationships. They need an opportunity to manage the
programs for which they should be held responsible without being burdened by
additional mandates and without being denied the state and federal benefits on
which they have been led to rely. In anticipation of the year 2000, city governments in partnership with their states should begin to define the role they will
England's

cities

—

—

play in the twenty-first century and to determine

their responsibilities will

be

New

England, as a region, does not need a national urban policy. New
England's cities do need to shape a new urban policy for themselves. In recognifinanced.

20

how

tion of

how

redefining

long

it

took for that policy to evolve to

it

Murphy's Laws,

amazing how long

"It's

it

its

Law

should begin today. As McGee's First
takes to

present state, the task of

The Book of
complete something you are
states in

not working on."
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